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The Compassionate Gift of Vice: Śāntideva 
on Gifts, Altruism, and Poverty 
 
Amod Lele 1 
 
Abstract2 
The Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker Śāntideva tells his audi-
ence to give out alcohol, weapons and sex for reasons of 
Buddhist compassion, though he repeatedly warns of the 
dangers of all these three. The article shows how Śāntide-
va resolves this issue: these gifts, and gifts in general, at-
tract their recipients to the virtuous giver, in a way that 
helps the recipients to become more virtuous in the long 
run. As a consequence, Śāntideva does recommend the al-
leviation of poverty, but assigns it a much smaller signifi-
cance than is usually supposed. His views run counter to 
                                                
1 Boston University. Email: lele@bu.edu.	  Website/blog: loveofallwisdom.com. 
2 This article draws on my dissertation which is available online at my website. I would 
like to thank Barbra Clayton, Oliver Freiberger, Paul Harrison and Maria Heim for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to thank those who 
contributed to the ideas in this article as I researched my dissertation—too many to list, 
but especially Janet Gyatso, Parimal Patil, Christopher Queen and Jonathan Schofer. 
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many engaged Buddhist discussions of political action, 
and lend support to the “modernist” interpretation of en-
gaged Buddhist practice. 
In his Śikṣāsamuccaya (Anthology on Training, abbreviated ŚS), the eighth-
century Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist thinker Śāntideva proclaims that a 
bodhisattva should think as follows: “I will give alcoholic drink (madya) 
even to alcohol drinkers; I will cause them to obtain mindfulness (smṛti) 
and introspection (samprajanya)” (ŚS 271). How, one might wonder, could 
giving alcohol to alcohol drinkers promote their mindfulness and intro-
spection? Especially when, in the same text, Śāntideva warns the bodhi-
sattva against alcohol consumption on the very grounds that it interferes 
with mindfulness and introspection (ŚS 120)? 
 In the same passage, Śāntideva’s advice on gift-giving takes an-
other surprising turn. As well as alcohol, he says, one can even legiti-
mately give the gift of weapons (ŚS 271)—a startling claim from a thinker 
who saves his harshest criticisms for anger and hatred and the harm 
they cause. And elsewhere in the text, Śāntideva even urges gifts of sex-
ual intercourse. He praises a monk named Jyotis, who broke his vows to 
satisfy a woman who lusted after him (ŚS 167); he even says that bodhi-
sattvas “intentionally become prostitutes . . . ” (ŚS 326). This even 
though he frequently condemns the dangers of sexuality and sexual at-
raction, in sometimes misogynistic terms (e.g., ŚS 81-2). 
 Sex, drugs and violence: these are not the gifts that one would 
expect from a pious Buddhist monk. Śāntideva’s praise of these gifts is 
particularly striking given his repeated alarm at the “three poisons” of 
lust, anger, and delusion (e.g., ŚS 209). With sex, weapons and alcohol, he 
seems to be enabling each of these three respectively, perhaps even ig-
noring his own advice about their dangers. What is he thinking? Why 
would one give gifts that seem so potentially dangerous?  
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 This article will show that there is a coherent logic underlying 
Śāntideva’s curious claims, based on Śāntideva’s own claims about the 
benefits of gift-giving to the recipient: in brief, the recipient benefits 
from the gift encounter rather than the gift object. The article will then 
show that this logic applies not merely in these particular cases of vice, 
but for gift-giving in general.  
 Because Śāntideva’s reasoning applies to gifts in general and not 
merely to these vices, it has significant wider implications for construc-
tive study, especially among politically engaged Buddhists. Ellison Banks 
Findly has claimed that to the extent that early Buddhist texts are con-
cerned with “questions of a good society, of civic equity, of social justice, 
and of righteous living in the broad community,” these questions are to 
be found in discussions of giving. So too, as we will see, “engaged” Bud-
dhist writers like Stephen Jenkins and Judith Simmer-Brown turn to 
Buddhist discussions of giving (including Śāntideva’s) as a scriptural or 
classical argument for political action to alleviate poverty. Indeed, as we 
will see, Śāntideva does advocate giving to the poor. We will see, howev-
er, that because Śāntideva’s gift-giving is about the gift encounter and 
not the gift object, it does not have the political implications that social-
ly engaged Buddhists often see it as having. This article’s investigation of 
Śāntideva therefore contributes to current debates about the origins and 
sources of Buddhist political concern. 
 
Śāntideva and His Thought3 
The name Śāntideva is associated above all with two extant texts, the 
Bodhicaryāvatāra (BCA) and the Śikṣāsamuccaya (ŚS). The Bodhicaryāvatāra 
                                                
3 This section is drawn largely from my dissertation. 
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(“Introduction to the Conduct of a Bodhisattva”), in its most widely 
known form, is a work of just over 900 verses. Tibetan legends suggest 
that the text was originally recited orally (see de Jong), as do the text’s 
own literary features (Kajihara). Although it has been translated into Ti-
betan multiple times and is revered throughout Tibetan Buddhist tradi-
tion, it was originally composed and redacted in Sanskrit. Its ten chap-
ters lead their reader through the path followed by an aspiring bodhi-
sattva—a future Buddha, and therefore a being on the way to perfection, 
according to Mahāyāna tradition. 4 
 The Śikṣāsamuccaya, already discussed in the introduction and 
also dealing with the bodhisattva path, is a longer prose work in nine-
teen chapters. The ŚS is structured as a commentary on twenty-seven 
short mnemonic verses known as the Śikṣāsamuccaya Kārikā (hereafter 
ŚSK). It consists primarily of quotations (of varying length) from sūtras, 
authoritative texts considered to be the word of the Buddha—generally 
those sūtras associated with Mahāyāna tradition.5 It too was originally 
composed in Sanskrit, as were the sūtras it quotes. 
 Indian and Tibetan tradition continually recommend that the two 
texts be studied together, on the basis of common authorship—
beginning with the canonical BCA itself, which proclaims “the 
                                                
4 The term Mahāyāna, literally “Great Vehicle,” came into use to mean the new idea of 
attempting to become a bodhisattva oneself. (The concept of the bodhisattva, as a future 
buddha, had existed in early Buddhism’s jātaka stories.) This was the earliest usage of 
the term mahāyāna in Sanskrit, although even by Śāntideva’s time, understandings of 
what becoming a bodhisattva involved had undergone many changes; the Mahāyāna 
had come to be understood as a separate school rather than an optional vocation (see 
Nattier, and Harrison, “Who”). Non-Mahāyāna schools are often referred to in the 
scholarly literature as “mainstream” Buddhism. 
5 Most scholars have taken the ŚS to be composed almost entirely of such quotations; 
Paul Harrison has recently claimed that a more substantial portion than previously 
thought is original to the redactor. 
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Śikṣāsamuccaya is necessarily (avaśyaṃ) to be looked at again and again” 
(BCA V.105). Other thinkers from the early Indian commentator 
Prajñākaramati to the present Dalai Lama also see the texts as mutually 
illustrating each other, based on common authorship. For these reasons, 
the article treats Śāntideva as the postulated author of both texts, in Al-
exander Nehamas’s sense. Rather than being equivalent to the historical 
writer, for Nehamas an author is “postulated as the agent whose actions 
account for the text’s features; he is a character, a hypothesis which is 
accepted provisionally, guides interpretation, and is in turn modified in 
its light” (145). The tradition, and its attribution of common authorship 
and coherence, is what produces the original hypothesis of a common 
author; this hypothesis is confirmed by the coherence of the two redact-
ed texts when taken as a unit.  
 It is difficult to learn much about the texts’ historical composer, 
or their redactor, beyond what is found in the texts themselves. Tibetan 
historians recount the life story of a Śāntideva identified as the texts’ 
author, but it is difficult to sort fact from legend, with so little corrobo-
rating evidence (see Pezzali and de Jong). There seems little reason to 
doubt that someone known by the name of Śāntideva wrote a significant 
portion of the two texts, or that he was a monk at the great monastic 
university of Nālandā; the Tibetan historians agree that Śāntideva lived 
at Nālandā, and based on what we know of Indian Buddhist history it 
seems a likely place for historically significant Buddhist works to have 
been composed. Paul Griffiths (114-24) uses the accounts of Chinese and 
Tibetan visitors to reconstruct a detailed account of what life and liter-
ary culture at Nālandā might have looked like. 
 Beyond these points, we can say relatively little beyond the ap-
proximate date of the texts’ composition. The Tibetan translator Ye shes 
sde, who rendered the BCA into Tibetan, worked under the Tibetan king 
Khri lde srong brtsan (816-838 CE), so it must have been composed be-
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fore that time (Bendall v). Since the Chinese pilgrim Yijing (aka I-tsing) 
mentions all the major Indian Mahāyāna thinkers known in India but 
does not mention Śāntideva, it is likely that these texts were composed, 
or at least became famous, after Yijing left India in 685 CE (Pezzali 38). 
We may therefore assign Śāntideva a date of approximately the eighth 
century. 
 The central concern of both of Śāntideva’s texts is the bodhisatt-
va. A bodhisattva is a being aiming to become a buddha (literally “awak-
ened one”); the process of the final transformation into a buddha is 
called bodhi, “awakening,” sometimes referred to as “enlightenment.”  
 The bodhisattva is distinguished primarily from “ordinary peo-
ple,” pṛthagjanas—essentially, people who are not bodhisattvas, whose 
minds have not been awakened. The term pṛthagjana is a Sanskritization 
of the Pāli putthujjana. In the (non-Mahāyāna) Pāli canon this term refers 
to a person who has not yet entered any of the traditional stages of Bud-
dhist achievement and retains all of the fetters (saṃyojana) leading to 
continued rebirth. The term does not mean a “non-Buddhist” in the con-
temporary sense; one can be a “good putthujjana” who strives but fails to 
realize Buddhist teaching (Nyanatiloka 161).  
 Theoretically, Śāntideva’s use of the term is an extension of this 
older meaning, as he refers at one point to “all buddhas, bodhisattvas, 
solitary buddhas, noble disciples and ordinary people” (ŚS 9)—suggesting 
that ordinary people are the residual category of all those who do not 
fall into the previous categories. It is standard in Mahāyāna texts to refer 
to three “vehicles” (yāna) or paths, with the vehicles of the disciple 
(śrāvaka) and solitary buddha (pratyekabuddha) being distinguished from 
the Great Vehicle (mahāyāna) of the bodhisattva. It is quite rare, howev-
er, for Śāntideva to refer to disciples and solitary buddhas, and even 
buddhas appear relatively infrequently, so in practice the most im-
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portant distinction in his texts is between bodhisattvas and ordinary 
people.  
 Śāntideva’s view of ordinary people is not flattering. The term 
“ordinary person” frequently occurs in his work alongside the term 
“fool” (bāla)—sometimes with the latter as a modifier (“foolish ordinary 
person,” bālapṛthagjana, as on ŚS 61) and sometimes with the two terms 
used synonymously and interchangeably, as on ŚS 194. Ordinary people’s 
foolishness traps them in suffering; the way for them to get out of suffer-
ing is to get on the bodhisattva path and become a bodhisattva. 
 Śāntideva refers to the process of becoming a bodhisattva in 
terms of the awakening mind (bodhicitta), a mental transformation that 
brings one out of the status of ordinary person and eventually toward 
awakening. Śāntideva makes an important distinction between two kinds 
of the awakening mind: the mind resolved on awakening (bodhi-
praṇidhicitta) and the mind proceeding to awakening (bodhiprasthānacit-
ta). The first, he tells us, can be reached quickly; it arises simply when 
one sincerely vows, “I must become a buddha” (SS 8). He is not as explicit 
about the nature of the second, but in describing the first he notes that 
“the awakening mind is productive even without conduct” (SS 9), sug-
gesting that conduct (caryā, bodhicaryā) may be what makes the differ-
ence between the mind resolved on awakening and the mind proceeding 
to awakening. Much of his work, especially after the first chapters of the 
BCA, seems intended for readers who have achieved the mind resolved 
on awakening but not the mind proceeding to awakening. 
 
The Benefits of Giving Vices 
With Śāntideva’s background in mind, let us return to the gifts of vice 
with which we began—starting with alcohol, where his reasoning is most 
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explicit. Why, for Śāntideva, does a bodhisattva give alcohol to alcohol 
drinkers? The advice to do so comes in a quote from the Ugraparipṛcchā 
Sūtra (abbreviated to Ugra), a Sanskrit text now available only in Tibetan 
and Chinese translation except for the Sanskrit quotations preserved in 
the ŚS (see Nattier). While the Ugra itself advocates giving alcohol in or-
der to produce mindfulness and introspection, it does not explain how 
the gift achieves its goal (Ugra 7A). 
 Śāntideva appears to recognize a problem, for he gives the Ugra 
quote an unusual extended gloss in his own words; in most cases the ŚS 
lets the sūtras speak for themselves. Śāntideva may be finding here an 
apparent conflict between sūtra scriptures. Immediately before quoting 
the Ugra on alcohol, Śāntideva quotes another sūtra, the Akṣayamati 
Sūtra, which proclaims that “there is no gift of poison or weapons, there 
is no gift that injures beings” (ŚS 271). He may also have in mind other 
sūtras, such as the Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhâvasthitasamādhi Sūtra, 
which argue that the bodhisattva should not give alcohol to others (Nat-
tier 110,n14). He needs to explain, then, how the Ugra can consistently 
advocate the gift of alcohol. 
 This is the explanation that Śāntideva gives in his own words, to 
help resolve the conflict: 
The meaning is: When a bodhisattva has caused the frus-
tration of hope, the [resulting] anger is more serious even 
than alcoholic drink. Therefore there is a loss of the at-
traction of beings; alcohol may be given in the absence of 
other means of peacefully pleasing them. (ŚS 271) 
 The key terms in this passage are “attraction” (saṃgraha) and 
“peacefully pleasing” (prasādana). It is to preserve and create the alcohol 
drinker’s attraction and peaceful pleasure (saṃgraha and prasāda) that 
the bodhisattva must give alcohol when asked to do so—create these 
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states in those who did not yet have them, preserve them in those who 
did. The attraction and peaceful pleasure, in turn, will create the mind-
fulness (smṛti) and introspection (samprajanya) that are central to the 
path as Śāntideva envisions it. 
 How will they do this? To find out, we need to examine more 
general ideals of gift-giving in Śāntideva’s thought, beyond this pas-
sage—focusing in particular on the meanings and usages of saṃgraha and 
prasāda. Saṃgraha, literally “grasping together,” refers in Buddhist San-
skrit to the attraction that beings feel to a bodhisattva. Edgerton (548) 
notes that several Buddhist Sanskrit texts (including the Dharmasaṅgra-
ha, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Mahāvastu, the Mahāvyutpatti and the 
Lalitavistara) refer to four “characteristics of attraction” (saṃgra-
havastus), behaviors by which bodhisattvas attract other beings—giving 
or generosity (dāna) being first among these.6 Śāntideva also refers mul-
tiple times to the characteristics of attraction as a set (ŚS 50, 95), alt-
hough he does not list the set’s members. In a passage comparing the 
Buddhas to fishermen, he claims that “having grabbed those beings by 
means of the Buddhas’ knowledge and of the line of the characteristics of 
attraction, having drawn them from the watery pond of saṃsāra [wan-
dering in rebirth], the blessed Buddhas establish them on the ground of 
nirvāṇa” (ŚS 95). Here, the characteristics of attraction—which include 
giving—are specified as something that lures others onto the bodhisattva 
path. 
 The ŚS speaks regularly of the bodhisattva’s task of attracting 
others to him; ŚSK 10-12, and the chapter of the ŚS (VI) that comments 
on these, focus on this task. As Susanne Mrozik (“Relationships” 65-8, 
“Virtuous” 75-7) has noted, this attraction is often said to result from the 
                                                
6 The list of characteristics of attraction also appears frequently in Pāli texts (Rhys 
Davids and Stede 666). 
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complex term prasāda, which I have rendered “peaceful pleasure.”7 It de-
rives from the verb prasīdati, literally “to settle down.” In ŚS XIV, the on-
tological or metaphysical chapter of the ŚS, Śāntideva uses the term a 
number of times to refer to a process by which the physical elements be-
come tranquil; but every other time he uses it, it has a psychological 
meaning, referring to a kind of mental state that is pleasurable and 
peaceful.8 He frequently alliterates it with prīti and prāmodya (each mean-
ing “joy”), treating it as a near synonym to them (e.g., ŚS 27, 183).  
 Śāntideva suggests that a bodhisattva creates peaceful pleasure in 
order to win others over to the bodhisattva path: 
. . . he also becomes suitable for the purposes of beings, 
because [he is] a maker of peaceful pleasure. How? Be-
cause of his supremely sweet speaking, always softly, a 
steady one can win over (āvarjayati) suitable people, and 
also becomes acceptable [to them]. This indeed is a duty of 
the bodhisattva, namely, the winning over of beings.9 
 Peaceful pleasure (prasāda), then, works to create attraction 
(saṁgraha), and the attraction in turn will win beings over to the bodhi-
sattva path. It is this mechanism that explains the gift of vice. The gifts 
                                                
7 In general, my argument here draws heavily on Mrozik’s (1998, 2007) perceptive and 
valuable discussion of the important role given in the ŚS to pleasing others. 
8 In many South Asian contexts, this peaceful pleasure becomes a “grace” or “kindness” 
displayed by a divine being, which often manifests itself in the food left over from an 
offering, establishing a hierarchical relationship between worshiper and deity (see for 
example Babb 53-61). The term’s ubiquity in South Asian traditions is such that it has 
gone beyond its South Asian context in startling ways. At www.prasada.com, one may 
find a website promoting a “new and refreshing master-planned community in 
Surprise, Arizona” which takes the name Prasada, “derived from the Sanskrit word 
meaning ‘grace’ or ‘peace’. . .” 
9 ŚS 124. The phrases in the middle make up ŚSK 10. 
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of alcohol and weapons please their recipients and attract them to bo-
dhisattvas, making them more open to receiving bodhisattvas’ teaching. 
Once a being has entered the bodhisattva path, in turn, she will be able 
to achieve the mindfulness and introspection that bodhisattvas seek. It is 
through this attraction, then, that the gift of alcohol can have what first 
seems a curious and counterintuitive effect: cause its recipient to obtain 
mindfulness and introspection. 
 Since Śāntideva’s passage glosses a quote from the Ugraparipṛcchā 
Sūtra, Mrozik (“Virtuous” 26) asks whether Śāntideva changes the mean-
ing of that text. Mrozik argues that Śāntideva uses the passage from the 
Ugra for a different purpose than the Ugra’s own. She notes that the Ugra 
provides a different explanation for the gift of alcohol: “And why is this? 
To fulfill all their desires is to carry out in full the bodhisattva’s perfec-
tion of giving” (Ugra 7A). While Mrozik is right to note the difference in 
the explanations offered, I would suggest that the two explanations are 
compatible. It is the Ugra, quoted by Śāntideva, which says the gift of al-
cohol is intended to promote mindfulness and introspection. It is not 
clear how fulfilling beings’ desires would promote mindfulness and in-
trospection—unless it is according to a logic like that I have just outlined, 
where peaceful pleasure attracts them onto the bodhisattva path. It 
seems entirely possible to me that the author of the Ugraparipṛcchā had 
the same logic in mind.  
 This same logic also holds in the passage describing the gift of 
sex. When the monk Jyotis has sex with the woman who desires him, the 
reason Śāntideva provides is that it produces a kuśalamūla in the benefi-
ciary (ŚS 167)—literally a “root of excellence,” a piece of good karma, a 
mental state which allows one to advance on the bodhisattva path. So 
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too, when bodhisattvas become prostitutes, it is “in order to draw men 
to them” (puṃsām ākārṣanāya te, ŚS 326).10 
 Śāntideva does mention the potentially dangerous consequences 
of the gifts of vice, but sees their benefit as outweighing these. After his 
discussion of giving alcohol, he turns to gifts of weapons, and claims 
“Even concerning a sword and so on, after consideration of bad and good 
consequences, one should make the gift, and then the thought ‘there is 
no transgression’ arrives” (ŚS 271). Possessing the gift may well be bad 
for the recipient, but the benefits of the gift encounter outweigh that 
danger.  
 Śāntideva does not specify a procedure of cost-benefit analysis, of 
how one may decide whether the gift’s benefit outweighs its dangers. In 
general I think he does not perform such analyses because he leaves 
them up to the discretion of the skillful bodhisattva, to “excellence in 
means” (upāyakauśalya). In speaking of alcohol, Śāntideva uses the ge-
rundive form deya (ŚS 271), and the gerundive in -ya does not have the 
imperative force of the gerundive in -tavya (Coulson 188-9); therefore, he 
is saying only that alcohol may be given, not necessarily that it always 
should be. 
 
Attraction Beyond Vice 
We have, then, an answer to the question with which we began. The bo-
dhisattva gives sex, alcohol and weapons in order to attract the gift’s re-
cipient to the bodhisattva path. This consequence is so momentous that 
                                                
10 ŚS 326. See Mrozik (1998, 144-51) for a discussion of the gender implications of this 
metaphor and similar passages. 
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it outweighs the danger posed by the recipient’s possession or partaking 
of the vice in question. 
 But the significance of this point goes well beyond the gift of vice 
itself, to Śāntideva’s more general theory of compassionate gift-giving—a 
theory that may well turn out to be expressed in other Buddhist texts. 
For Śāntideva, attraction is a central component to compassionate gift-
giving in general, not merely to the gift of vice. 
 I specify compassionate gift-giving because, in Śāntideva’s work, 
gift-giving can have other motivations beyond compassionate benefit to 
others. For him, very often, giving functions primarily as a form of self-
cultivation. Sometimes this is a matter of reducing one’s attachment to 
material objects; Śāntideva often uses terms for “giving” that are synon-
ymous with “renunciation” or “nonattachment” (utsarga, tyāga). Some-
times it is a matter of expressing one’s esteem or faith (śraddhā) in more 
advanced beings, such as one’s guru or the celestial bodhisattvas (as in 
BCA chapter II). In the next section we will see other ways in which giv-
ing serves as self-cultivation. 
 In this article, however, I am primarily concerned with compas-
sionate gifts—gifts made out of a concern for others’ suffering and in-
tended to benefit them. Śāntideva endorses the view that one gives for 
beings’ enjoyment (paribhogāya satvānām, ŚSK 5), adding that one also 
preserves the gift for the sake of their enjoyment (satvôpabhogārtham, 
ŚSK 6). The purpose of the gifts of vice, as I have described above, is also 
compassionate in this sense. The way that beings benefit from enjoying 
their gifts, however, is not what one might first think. 
 On a common-sense understanding of gift-giving, one might 
think that the recipient benefits by having the gift in her possession, be-
ing able to use it. Śāntideva, however, places a much greater emphasis 
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on the benefit of being attracted to the bodhisattva path—not merely in 
the peculiar cases of alcohol, gifts and weapons, but for gifts in general. 
 Śāntideva discusses gift-giving most extensively in the first chap-
ter of the ŚS. Several passages in this chapter—the chapter of Śāntideva’s 
work most devoted to the praise of generous giving—confirm the claim 
that giving is a way for the bodhisattva to win recipients over, at a level 
much broader than the gifts of vice. Right before declaring that giving is 
itself the awakening or enlightenment of the bodhisattva (dānaṃ hi bo-
dhisatvasya bodhir, ŚS 35), Śāntideva again compares the bodhisattva’s 
potential gift offerings to bait on a fish hook, in helping others to cross 
to awakening (ŚS 34). While praising the awakening mind, too, Śāntideva 
notes how some past bodhisattvas were able to produce the awakening 
mind in others by giving particular things to them, giving long lists of 
cases where this happened (ŚS 9). 
 Later in the text, Śāntideva praises the giving of the highly ad-
vanced bodhisattvas who have acquired supernatural powers. Here, he 
specifically says that they do so in order to train or lead (vinayati or 
vineti) other beings (ŚS 328-9). This process of leading is described as “the 
miracle that is attraction of and knowledge of the world,” or alternately 
“the miracle that is knowing how to attract the world”11 (jagasaṃgra-
hajñānavikurvā, ŚS 327). Here too, giving is a means to draw people closer 
to the bodhisattva.  
 Śāntideva’s approach may appear to parallel those of evangelical 
Christians who see giving to the poor as a form of “social outreach” to 
promote conversion. Omri Elisha (444), for example, interviews evangel-
icals for whom “nourished stomachs and softened hearts are a means to 
a proselytic end,” telling him “You can’t talk to an empty stomach. Com-
                                                
11 I thank Paul Harrison for suggesting the latter translation. Either way, the point 
remains that bodhisattvas give in order to lead by attraction. 
709 Journal of Buddhist Ethics 
 
 
passion has to come before the message.” There is indeed one parallel in 
that in both cases, the material giving is for non-material purposes.  
 Nevertheless, the purpose is different; according to Martin Marty, 
Śāntideva’s aim is not “proselytization” as such, if proselytization is un-
derstood conventionally as “inducement to convert” (1). The goals of 
Śāntideva’s attraction are not stated in terms of inducing people to fol-
low the Buddhas and their dharma, let alone of bringing people over 
from false doctrines. When ŚSK 10 says a bodhisattva should “win over” 
(āvarjayati) people, Śāntideva glosses this term only as “developing” 
them (paripāka, literally “cooking” or “ripening,” ŚS 124).12 Some sort of 
personal transformation is involved here; the transformation is not, 
however, one of movement between traditions. Rather, as we saw above, 
the goals involve producing mindfulness (smṛti) and introspection (sam-
prajanya), virtues not limited to a Buddhist context. The goal is also de-
scribed as producing pieces of good karma (kuśalamūlas) in the recipi-
ents, and good karma can be used for a variety of purposes, not neces-
sarily Buddhist ones.13 The closest Christian equivalent might be found in 
Thomas Thangaraj’s ideal of “evangelism without proselytism”: an at-
tempt to produce a profound and beneficial personal transformation 
that does not primarily involve making others into Christians. 
 
Engaged Buddhism 
Let us now turn to the broader implications of Śāntideva’s views of gift-
giving. As noted, in Buddhist texts, it is often in discussions of gift-giving 
                                                
12 See Mrozik (2004) for a discussion of this term and its implications. 
13 The point fits with Brekke’s observation that in classical Indian Buddhism, 
“conversion” from householder to monk is more important than conversion from one 
monastic tradition to another (such as Jainism to Buddhism). 
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that one finds the closest analogue to contemporary concerns of social 
justice and poverty alleviation. Śāntideva’s approach to gift-giving, how-
ever, bring into question some contemporary views on these topics, es-
pecially those associated with engaged Buddhism. 
 The term “engaged Buddhism,” attributed to the Vietnamese 
monk Thich Nhat Hanh, is usually a shorthand for “socially engaged” or 
“politically engaged” Buddhism: thought and practice that understands 
itself as Buddhist amid “energetic engagement with social and political 
issues and crises” (Queen ix). There is a debate among scholars of en-
gaged Buddhism on its provenance: is engaged Buddhism a modern re-
form of Buddhist tradition, or an element of Buddhism dating back to 
antiquity? Thomas Yarnall provides a long account of this debate, nam-
ing its two sides based on their characterization of engaged Buddhism: 
those who see it as modern he calls “modernists,” and those who see it as 
traditional “traditionists.” As we will see, Yarnall stands firmly on the 
“traditionist” side; I will argue in the next section that Śāntideva’s work 
provides significant support for the “modernists.”  
 On both sides of this debate, however, much of the scholarly en-
gaged Buddhist literature shares an assumption, often unquestioned, 
that political action is a good. In speaking of the founding of the Bud-
dhist Peace Fellowship, for example, Simmer-Brown claims with some 
shock and surprise “that Buddhist practice centers and groups had be-
come entirely removed from the social and political issues of the day: 
some teachers and organizations were even actively discouraging politi-
cal involvement” (“Speaking Truth” 69). Yarnall goes considerably fur-
ther, accusing the modernists of “a subtle form of neo-colonial, neo-
Orientalist bias” (289) because they believe that political engagement is 
found in their Buddhism but not in that of precolonial Asia. Śāntideva’s 
views, I want to show, undercut Yarnall’s claim and provide important 
cautions for contemporary engaged Buddhists. 
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 Engaged Buddhists take action on a number of political issues, 
including peace and the environment. I focus here on one such issue: 
poverty alleviation. Several authors, including José Ignacio Cabezón, Ju-
dith Simmer-Brown (“Suffering”) and Stephen Jenkins , have correctly 
made claims to the effect that bodhisattvas relieve poverty and material 
suffering, often turning to Śāntideva for textual support. However, they 
have not sufficiently explored the bodhisattva’s motivations for doing 
so. 
 Cabezón, for example, quotes famous verses from BCA chapter 
VIII that provide a metaphysical justification for altruism, arguing that 
the self is an illusion and that therefore one should alleviate everyone’s 
suffering equally (302). Śāntideva certainly does urge such an unquali-
fied altruism. The question is: how does this altruism express itself? 
What sorts of actions follow from the proposition that one should bene-
fit everyone? Cabezón, following Tibetan tradition and especially the 
works of the Dalai Lama,14 stresses political action on behalf of the poor 
and oppressed. I argue, however, that this is not Śāntideva’s own view. 
For him, the important thing is developing others’ virtue, making them 
more like bodhisattvas. 
 Is there a relationship between developing virtue and poverty 
alleviation? Jenkins’s article deals with the topic in greatest detail.15 He 
begins by noting a passage in Śāntideva’s work that minimizes the im-
                                                
14 Throughout his article, Cabezón draws his views from Tibetan tradition, especially 
those of the present Dalai Lama. I will not take a position here on the question of 
whether Tibetans have themselves misinterpreted Śāntideva; to argue that point either 
way would require at least a separate article and possibly a book. 
15 Others, such as Christopher Ives (34, 41n15), cite Jenkins as an authority to the effect 
that Buddhists have long been concerned with suffering caused “by social, economic, 
political, and environmental problems” and not only with suffering caused by bad 
mental states. 
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portance of poverty alleviation, which he translates as follows: “If the 
perfection of generosity were the alleviation of the world’s poverty, then 
since beings are still starving now, in what manner did the previous 
Buddhas perfect it?” (BCA V.9, quoted in Jenkins 40). In response, he 
provides many quotations from texts identified as Mahāyāna which do 
recommend that bodhisattvas relieve poverty, and more generally suf-
fering born of material causes. Indeed, one of these quotes is from the ŚS: 
“And he gives the best fine food to beings wishing to eat (jighatsita) . . . 
and he satisfies poor (daridra) beings through possessions (bhogas) . . . 
and he makes a distribution of possessions to beings afflicted by poverty 
(daridraduṣkhita).”16 Jenkins is absolutely correct to note that Śāntideva’s 
bodhisattva does attempt to provide for poor people. The question is: 
why does he do it? 
 Jenkins answers that material well-being is necessary for spiritual 
benefit—that poverty makes people worse or prevents them from be-
coming better. Jenkins identifies this connection most explicitly in the 
early (non-Mahāyāna) Cakkavattī-Sīhanāda Sūtra, where a king’s refusal to 
alleviate poverty leads his kingdom to theft (43). He finds similar con-
nections in Mahāyāna sources such as the Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom, 
in which bodhisattvas “provide all beings with everything that brings 
ease—food for the hungry, drink to the thirsty . . . ” and then lead those 
beings to awakening (45). The chronological order of the bodhisattva’s 
                                                
16 ŚS 274. I use my own translation here. Jenkins (48n17) instead refers to Bendall and 
Rouse’s translation; their translation suggests that the first phrase refers more clearly 
to poverty alleviation than it actually does, by rendering it “When any are hungry he 
gives them the best food.” Śāntideva’s term is jighatsita, a desiderative from √ghas “eat,” 
rather than a term deriving from √kṣudh, the root more commonly used for hunger, 
especially the kind of chronic hunger that could come from poverty. So in this passage 
he may well mean that the bodhisattva serves rarefied delicacies to gourmets. 
However, this translation issue does not itself annul Jenkins’s overall point, since later 
parts of the passage in question explicitly refer to poverty (dāridrya). 
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actions is one important piece of evidence for Jenkins: the bodhisattva 
first provides food and drink, and only then leads the beings to awaken-
ing. Linking such Mahāyāna texts with the Cakkavattī-Sīhanāda, Jenkins 
concludes that bodhisattvas satisfy material needs first because doing so 
is a necessary condition for awakening: in both kinds of texts there is “a 
distinction and relation between material and moral goods, where mate-
rial goods have priority as a prerequisite for moral well-being” (46). Pov-
erty alleviation, on Jenkins’s account, is central to the bodhisattva’s 
work, indeed more important than moral development, because the lat-
ter cannot happen without the former. In the following sections, I argue 
that Jenkins’s view on this point is incorrect. 
 
Śāntideva on Poverty Alleviation 
As we have already seen in earlier sections, the connection between 
poverty alleviation and spiritual benefit appears very differently in Śān-
tideva’s work than in Jenkins’s. There are indeed numerous passages in 
Śāntideva’s work where he says that bodhisattvas give to the poor and 
hungry and thirsty. But what is his reasoning? Śāntideva does sometimes 
follow the chronological order that Jenkins notes in other texts, claiming 
that bodhisattvas first relieve poverty and then teach spiritually: he says 
that “in ages of famine, [bodhisattvas] become food and drink,” and then 
adds in the next sentence that “having removed hunger and thirst, they 
teach the dharma to living beings” (ŚS 325). 
 But the importance of attraction strongly suggests a different 
logic than Jenkins’s. The bodhisattva removes hunger and thirst first, not 
because they present intrinsic obstacles to beings’ receiving the teach-
ing, but because he needs to win over the beings he will teach. It is soon 
after discussing the removal of hunger and thirst, in the same passage, 
that Śāntideva says bodhisattvas “intentionally become prostitutes in 
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order to draw men to them”; they even become dutiful slaves in order to 
win over their masters (ŚS 326). Similarly, in other passages poverty al-
leviation is treated as one kind of giving among many. For example, in 
the final chapter of the BCA, Śāntideva conducts a redirection of good 
karma (pariṇāmanā), attempting to use his accumulated good karma to 
provide for others; he tries to provide food and drink, but as part of a list 
that includes perfumes and ornaments (X.20).17 
 One might ask whether poverty alleviation might help awaken 
beings in both respects: giving attracts them to the path, and material 
want presents an obstacle to their getting on the path.18 Śāntideva never 
says, however, that poverty interferes with spiritual advancement. In-
deed, there are a number of passages that suggest it might even help—
because possessions (lābha) of any kind lead one to dangerous states of 
attachment.19 Śāntideva argues that property (lābha) is to be avoided by a 
bodhisattva because it generates desire (rāga, ŚS 105), and that therefore 
“great gain (bahulābhatā) is among the obstacles to the Mahāyāna” (ŚS 
145). Elsewhere he describes protecting possessions as a “torment” or 
“burden” (kheda, BCA VIII.87) In his praise of giving he contrasts the 
great spiritual fruitfulness of what is given away with the dangers of 
what is in one’s own home (yad gṛhe, ŚS 19). By contrast, Śāntideva also 
describes physical hardships—including hunger and thirst—as insignifi-
                                                
17 In this regard, one of Bendall and Rouse’s translations is  again misleading. In 
Śāntideva’s longest and most systematic discussion of giving in ŚS I, the recipient is 
frequently referred to as a yācanaka. Bendall and Rouse render this term as “beggar,” 
which is a sense it can have, but the word more broadly means “requester, one who 
requests,” from the root yāc “ask, request”; and nothing in the passage suggests that 
the yācanaka is necessarily poor or a mendicant, as the term “beggar” would imply. 
18 I thank Barbra Clayton for raising this point (in a personal communication). 
19 Indeed, Śāntideva sees the two as so closely linked that he often uses the same word 
(parigraha) to refer both to physical possessions and to the dangerous emotional 
attachment they produce. 
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cant at worst, perhaps even beneficial opportunities to develop one’s pa-
tient endurance (kṣānti, BCA VI.15). 
 Now since most of these claims are aimed at aspiring bodhisatt-
vas, one might suggest that possessions do not pose a similar danger for 
ordinary people; but while they might be neutral for ordinary people’s 
advancement, it is unlikely that they are positive. Where correlations 
between material goods and spiritual well-being appear in Śāntideva’s 
work, they are negative.20  
 One apparent exception is the monk’s robe and bowl, which a bo-
dhisattva is urged not to give away (ŚS 145); these, it would seem, can be 
beneficial to possess. But this passage should likely be read in the light of 
Śāntideva’s numerous exhortations on monastic comportment. On ŚS 67 
he argues that even an immoral monk may be able to lead others benefi-
cially, by virtue of his monastic appearance.21 The monk’s bowl, like his 
robe, is important because it marks him as a monk, not because it is the 
monk’s means of attaining food. 
 Śāntideva’s work, then, supports Jenkins’s claim about the chron-
ological order of the bodhisattva’s action—first give, then teach—but not 
about its logic. Examining the Bhaiṣajyaguru Sūtra, Jenkins says: “There is 
a correlation here between material support and proselytization, but the 
reasoning is always that in order to create the conditions necessary for 
benefitting people spiritually, one must first attend to their material 
needs” (46). This reasoning does not appear to be Śāntideva’s. His con-
cern is primarily with satisfying wants rather than attending to needs; 
the more pressing concern is spiritual benefit, and material benefit is 
important because often that is the only way to reach people. 
                                                
20 For more discussion of these points, see Lele 93-100, 124-8, 136-9. 
21 See Mrozik 1998, 63-74 for discussion of this and related points. 
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 As noted in the previous section, attraction is not the only reason 
that Śāntideva’s bodhisattva gives gifts, to the poor or anyone else. But 
his other reasons also do not support the thesis that poverty alleviation 
is a prerequisite for spiritual benefit. Especially, one of the key reasons 
Śāntideva gives for poverty alleviation, as for other kinds of giving, is 
self-cultivation, of various kinds.  
 One major context for alleviating hunger and poverty in Śāntide-
va’s work is the redirection of good karma (pariṇāmanā): when one be-
lieves that one has generated good karma for oneself, one makes a de-
termined wish that this karma will work to benefit others in various 
ways. Judith Simmer-Brown (“Suffering,” 108-9) points to a passage 
about karmic redirection (BCA III.8-10) to indicate that Śāntideva’s bo-
dhisattva works to benefit the poor. Elsewhere, however, Śāntideva 
notes that a key purpose of karmic redirection is to develop one’s own 
compassion (maitrī, ŚS 213-19). And the karmic redirection that Simmer-
Brown identifies is specifically a part of the anuttarapūjā or Sevenfold 
Worship ritual, a ritual that takes up BCA II and III and culminates in the 
generation of the awakening mind, making one a bodhisattva.22 The ulti-
mate purpose of becoming a bodhisattva is of course to benefit other be-
ings; but in the immediate context, the mental attempt to alleviate pov-
erty turns out to be for one’s own development. 
                                                
22 The commentator Prajñākaramati, commenting on BCA IV.1, confirms that the 
purpose of the anuttarapūjā is to generate the awakening mind. Crosby and Skilton (11) 
agree that this is the ritual’s purpose. Luís Gómez suggests an alternate interpretation 
where karmic redirection, rather than the development of the awakening mind, is the 
purpose of the ritual: “the ritual is a means toward acquiring merit and then 
relinquishing it, dedicating it to one’s own awakening and to the awakening of all living 
beings.” If this were so, however, one would wonder why the awakening mind and the 
bodhisattva vow come last, after the karmic redirection has already taken place. The 
redirection seems to be a penultimate step here. 
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 Similarly, the passage that Jenkins cites from the ŚS is in the con-
text of enhancing one’s own person (ātmabhāva), and specifically in-
creasing one’s own strength or power (bala). In a quote from the Tathāga-
taguhya Sūtra (ŚS 274), the bodhisattva Vajrapāṇi says that there are ten 
ways to obtain strength like his; giving food and satisfying the poor are 
among them. What is the causal connection between these actions and 
becoming stronger? It seems to be that, by giving these items up and 
producing attraction in their beneficiaries, one receives good karma and 
thereby is reborn as a stronger person in future lives. Here too, the ra-
tionale offered here for provision to the poor is the bodhisattva’s own 
development, not any material benefit to them.  
 None of this is to say that material benefit plays no role in Śān-
tideva’s thought. He does claim that real suffering (vyathā) comes from 
material deprivation; in BCA III.8, the passage to which Simmer-Brown 
refers, he refers to kṣutpipāsavyathā, suffering deriving from or consist-
ing of hunger and thirst. But he tends to deemphasize this suffering. He 
claims in BCA V.6 that “all fears and immeasurable sufferings” come 
from the mind alone; there are some sufferings which derive from mate-
rial causes, but these are relatively minor. He expounds on these topics 
at greatest length in his chapters on kṣānti, patient endurance (BCA VI 
and ŚS IX), where he notes that minor (mṛdu) suffering can be greatly 
exaggerated by poor mental states and even great suffering can be alle-
viated with proper practice. So, when Śāntideva does make a mental de-
termination to alleviate suffering, as in his karmic redirections in BCA X, 
he refers to beings afflicted by bodily and mental suffering (kāyacitta-
vyathā), hoping that they will attain “oceans of happiness and delight” 
(BCA X.2).  
 What Śāntideva never does, however, is imply, as Jenkins does, 
that the alleviation of material suffering is a prerequisite for spiritual 
benefit. There is one point, at ŚS 161, where his language suggests a logic 
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like Jenkins’s, in which poverty causes moral degeneration. Here he re-
fers to his bad karma made by means of śāṭhyadāridryadoṣa: a “wicked-
ness-poverty-fault.” Bendall and Rouse (159) translate this phrase as “the 
deceitful offences of poverty,” suggesting perhaps that poverty is at the 
root of wickedness or deceit (śāṭhya), or that allowing the existence of 
poverty is itself an offence. The phrase could also be read as “the faults 
of wickedness and poverty,” removing the connection between the two. 
Either way, however, the Sanskrit compound is modified by another 
compound: īrṣyamātsaryahetu, “caused by envy and jealousy.” That is, 
whatever faults are at issue here—likely including poverty—have envy 
and jealousy as their root, a claim supported by Śāntideva’s claim a few 
pages before that rebirth in poverty is a consequence of excessive pride 
(māna, ŚS 153). It is not clear here, in other words, whether poverty 
causes bad behavior; in the text it seems clearer that bad behavior causes 
poverty, and it is preventing the bad behavior that, for Śāntideva, must 
take priority. 
 We have seen in Śāntideva’s work, then, that a key rationale for 
bodhisattvas’ poverty alleviation is the production of attraction in the 
beneficiary; that bodhisattvas also alleviate poverty for their own self-
cultivation; and that, while material aid to deprived beings can directly 
alleviate some of their suffering, this alleviation is neither a prerequisite 
nor a priority when placed beside the importance of benefitting beings 
spiritually in the long run. With these insights in mind, we may now be 
better able to see why Śāntideva seems to disparage poverty alleviation 
at BCA V.9 even though he advocates it elsewhere in his work. Alleviat-
ing poverty helps alleviate some suffering; but it is not one of the bodhi-
sattva’s more significant tasks. 
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Śāntideva on Political Engagement 
Having understood Śāntideva’s views on poverty alleviation, we are in a 
better position to understand his more general views on political en-
gagement. In a worldview where material need is as important as Jenkins 
claims, one would expect that government would play an important role: 
“to prevent social degeneration by attending to the needs of the poor,” 
as Jenkins (46) says of his mainstream Buddhist sources. But Śāntideva’s 
few comments on government serve primarily to reject its significance. 
In a discussion of knowledge and textual learning—which kinds are valu-
able and which not—he specifically includes texts on law and politics 
(daṇḍanīti śāstras) among the kinds of knowledge which are fruitless 
(apârtha), are opposed to liberation (mokṣapratikūla), lead to delusion 
(saṃmoha), and are therefore to be avoided (parivarjitavya) by one who 
has set out or is established on the bodhisattva path (ŚS 192). The bodhi-
sattva, Śāntideva tells us here, does not concern himself with politics.  
 On rare occasions, Śāntideva does offer advice to kings—but the 
advice is that they give their kingdoms up entirely. ŚS 19-34 lavishly de-
tail the bodhisattva’s giving, going on at length about the many things 
he is supposed to give up. A number of times there, a kingdom (rājya) is 
listed as an item among these, as are other things only a king might pos-
sess. For example, he cites the Vajradhvaja Sūtra23 as describing the bo-
dhisattva in the following way: 
It also said: “And giving himself to all beings or receiving 
the presence of all buddhas, he is giving a kingdom or a 
citadel, or a city or capital decorated with all ornaments, 
or, according to worthiness, giving up his whole entou-
                                                
23 Although it may have existed independently in India, this sūtra is now usually known 
as a portion of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, which is in turn better known by the Chinese name 
Huayan Sūtra. 
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rage to those who ask; or giving his son, daughter and 
wife to those who ask; or abandoning his entire dwelling, 
and likewise giving all enjoyments.” (ŚS 27) 
 The king’s giving away of his kingdom in such passages might 
seem to be the closest that Śāntideva comes to urging that giving happen 
through a political institution; but the giving seems to be treated as a 
matter of the king giving his own property as any other bodhisattva 
would. The gifts described are extravagant; giving luxuries to the rich 
appears about as beneficial as giving basic needs to the poor. Cabezón is 
therefore technically right when he says that “virtuous action on behalf 
of the oppressed creates merit and aids in the task of mental purifica-
tion”—but for Śāntideva, this is true of virtuous action on behalf of any-
one. Oppression is not the issue. The poor do not get priority as a recipi-
ent of the gift; it is not a matter of using the power of state institutions 
to improve others’ material conditions.  
 We can therefore explain Śāntideva’s dismissive comments about 
politics: the state qua state can do little to improve people’s well-being, 
because oppression and material want are not the primary causes of 
their suffering. The real causes are mental; one should work very hard to 
alleviate others’ suffering, but one does this best through individual 
teaching encounters, in which gift-giving is one part. 
 Now the significance of these points should not be exaggerated. 
Jenkins is dealing explicitly with a broad range of mainstream and 
Mahāyāna texts; I am dealing here with only two Mahāyāna texts and 
one author. A more general characterization of South Asian Buddhist 
gift-giving ideology is beyond the scope of this article. It is reasonable to 
expect that the many Buddhist sources written in South Asia over thou-
sands of years would disagree with each other.  
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 Nevertheless, having looked at a wide range of sources including 
the BCA and ŚS, Jenkins claims that it is a “reasonable generalization” to 
see poverty as an “obstruction to spiritual progress” in the Mahāyāna, 
and a “clear mandate for its direct relief as a prerequisite for addressing 
the more subtle roots of saṃsāra.” Jenkins makes these claims by reading 
Mahāyāna injunctions for poverty alleviation “in light of those sūtras 
which speak directly on the relationship between material and moral 
well-being.” Having looked at Śāntideva’s work, however, we see that 
despite Śāntideva’s own instructions to alleviate poverty, this relation-
ship does not hold. Material and moral well-being are largely separate, 
and moral well-being takes priority. To the extent that moral well-being 
is promoted by the alleviation of poverty, the connection has to do with 
attraction and not with material well-being or need. Jenkins’s generali-
zation does not hold in these texts; we might reasonably suspect that 
there are other Mahāyāna texts where it does not hold either. 
 
Conclusions 
We have seen that Śāntideva’s texts describe and illustrate a counterin-
tuitive approach to compassionate gift-giving. One gives gifts in order to 
create attraction in the recipient, and thereby make the recipient more 
virtuous, closer to a Buddhist spiritual path. This logic is clearest in the 
case of problematic gifts like alcohol, sex and weapons, but it applies to 
all gifts more generally. 
 In this respect, Śāntideva complicates discussions of poverty alle-
viation in Mahāyāna tradition. Remedies of material deprivation may 
often chronologically precede spiritual teaching in his work, but contra-
ry to Stephen Jenkins’s interpretation, material benefit is not a prerequi-
site for spiritual benefit, nor is material deprivation a hindrance. Rather, 
when the two are connected, it is because the gift attracts the recipient 
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toward the giver. Śāntideva does suggest other motivations for alleviat-
ing poverty, but in no case is it a prerequisite or a priority.  
 Śāntideva’s view offers one piece of evidence for what Yarnall 
calls the “modernist” interpretation of engaged Buddhism: political en-
gagement is not a concern of at least this one classical, precolonial 
thinker. Indeed, Śāntideva offers cogent, powerful Mahāyāna arguments 
against political involvement: it does much less to alleviate others’ suffer-
ing than we think it does. One might speculate that similar views could 
have animated Simmer-Brown’s teachers who “were even actively dis-
couraging political involvement”—teachers whose own voices go entire-
ly unheard in Simmer-Brown’s piece.  
 If we take Śāntideva’s anti-political stance seriously, it becomes 
much harder to dismiss a “modernist” view of Engaged Buddhism as the 
product of Orientalist bias. Some traditional Buddhists were anti-
political for thoughtful and important reasons, reasons that often go un-
reported amid the contemporary excitement over Engaged Buddhism. 
We do precolonial Buddhists no favors by silencing their voices to make 
them more palatable for contemporary activist tastes. There may be pre-
colonial Buddhists who were more enthusiastic about political participa-
tion than Śāntideva was, but the voices of anti-political Buddhists like 
Śāntideva nevertheless matter. (Yarnall, for his part, cites almost no evi-
dence from precolonial Buddhist tradition, thereby giving us little rea-
son to believe that other precolonial Buddhists’ views differed from Śān-
tideva’s.) 
 A “modernist” position, by contrast—of which Christopher Queen 
is the best known exponent—allows Buddhists like Śāntideva their voice, 
while respectfully disagreeing with it. A modernist approach to Engaged 
Buddhism is a conscious modification of the tradition as understood—
just as the Mahāyāna was in its day.  
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 A modernist approach also points to analogies between Buddhism 
and contemporary reinterpretations of other traditions, such as Chris-
tian liberation theology. Cabezón has claimed that in the Tibetan libera-
tion movement, “Traditional philosophical speculation and scriptural 
interpretation are not seen as obstacles to social action, the case with 
various liberation theologians. Rather, as we have seen, they are per-
ceived as providing the theoretical and spiritual basis for action” (311, 
emphasis Cabezón’s). If my argument here has been sound, then engaged 
Buddhists may have more to learn from liberation theology than they 
had previously thought. 
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